There's been a lot of discussion the past few days about whether we should talk to our enemies, as Obama has stated he plans to do, or whether that's a form of appeasement, as Bush and McCain contend. This is an issue which has bubbled up previously in the campaign, Clinton was quite critical of Obama, but, since Bush's speech in Israel, it's become front-burner stuff.
Matt Yglesias has a post, titled Prestige, that asks, "What are we afraid of?" I'm going to delve into this a little more deeply, if only to try to work out what the implications of talking to, say, Iran would be. The contention of Bush, McCain, and Clinton is that speaking directly to nations that have expressed enmity toward us (or Israel, apparently the only ally we feel quite this strongly about; after all, we continue to be in bed with China despite their hostility to the government of our putative friend Taiwan) gives those nations worldwide prestige, enhancing their status in the eyes of other countries.
I asked a friend of mine who was born overseas what the reaction would be in her country if the United States were to talk with Iran. She felt that it would be a matter of, "What is the U.S. doing?," but Iran itself would not be elevated in any way.
And that's the crux of the matter to me. It's something of a game theory problem, in that we have actions we can take and responses the other side can make. To analyze it requires us to figure out what the alternative to talking is - saber-rattling, economic sanctions, war. I'll talk through it lieu of making a table.
Let's take Iran, and assume our primary goal is to halt their nuclear weapons development program. First, we need to be certain that they have such a program; it would not be unprecedented for a country to insist they had a WMD program to maintain their prestige, even though they didn't have one at all. It would be ruinous to impose sanctions or wage war, hurting the citizens of a country, if they actually didn't pose a threat.
So we'll stipulate that they have such a program. One key is that, if we start by talking, the other actions are not precluded. We can always stop talking and bring out the cruise missiles if needed. Negotiation might succeed, and, if it does so, we will do the least harm to the least people.
The other actions might well ratchet up real tension, will probably spill over into the region as a whole, and are harder to withdraw. Saber-rattling and sanctions are not guaranteed to work, as we have seen in Cuba. War, while effective, carries its own set of problems, as we well know.
So talking has a lot going for it. But, there's the contention that sitting down with Ahmadinejad will enhance his stature in the rest of the world, that the act of shaking hands with the American president will bless the Iranian's viewpoint.
First of all, we're the big dog. Whatever propaganda Iran might try to get out of a meeting, the reality is that we can still wipe them off the face of the earth any time we'd like. That the mythical "world community" might give props to Mahmud pales in the face of the facts.
Second, and more importantly, I have serious doubts that there is a big prestige factor at work. Our allies, particularly in the face of our actions in Iraq, will probably welcome a more subdued approach; it seems unlikely in the extreme that Britain will embrace Iran because we spoke with them. And those people who are already against us, sure, maybe they'll cheer on Iran, but there's some chance they're already doing that (not a very big one; Iran is not very popular).
So what's the problem here? Shouldn't we engage with the world, friends and enemies, until it's clear that other actions are needed? Aren't we big enough to do that? No one wants America to be foolish, but unilateral behavior seems to create at least as many problems as it solves, and we definitely need to stop that.
Matt Yglesias has a post, titled Prestige, that asks, "What are we afraid of?" I'm going to delve into this a little more deeply, if only to try to work out what the implications of talking to, say, Iran would be. The contention of Bush, McCain, and Clinton is that speaking directly to nations that have expressed enmity toward us (or Israel, apparently the only ally we feel quite this strongly about; after all, we continue to be in bed with China despite their hostility to the government of our putative friend Taiwan) gives those nations worldwide prestige, enhancing their status in the eyes of other countries.
I asked a friend of mine who was born overseas what the reaction would be in her country if the United States were to talk with Iran. She felt that it would be a matter of, "What is the U.S. doing?," but Iran itself would not be elevated in any way.
And that's the crux of the matter to me. It's something of a game theory problem, in that we have actions we can take and responses the other side can make. To analyze it requires us to figure out what the alternative to talking is - saber-rattling, economic sanctions, war. I'll talk through it lieu of making a table.
Let's take Iran, and assume our primary goal is to halt their nuclear weapons development program. First, we need to be certain that they have such a program; it would not be unprecedented for a country to insist they had a WMD program to maintain their prestige, even though they didn't have one at all. It would be ruinous to impose sanctions or wage war, hurting the citizens of a country, if they actually didn't pose a threat.
So we'll stipulate that they have such a program. One key is that, if we start by talking, the other actions are not precluded. We can always stop talking and bring out the cruise missiles if needed. Negotiation might succeed, and, if it does so, we will do the least harm to the least people.
The other actions might well ratchet up real tension, will probably spill over into the region as a whole, and are harder to withdraw. Saber-rattling and sanctions are not guaranteed to work, as we have seen in Cuba. War, while effective, carries its own set of problems, as we well know.
So talking has a lot going for it. But, there's the contention that sitting down with Ahmadinejad will enhance his stature in the rest of the world, that the act of shaking hands with the American president will bless the Iranian's viewpoint.
First of all, we're the big dog. Whatever propaganda Iran might try to get out of a meeting, the reality is that we can still wipe them off the face of the earth any time we'd like. That the mythical "world community" might give props to Mahmud pales in the face of the facts.
Second, and more importantly, I have serious doubts that there is a big prestige factor at work. Our allies, particularly in the face of our actions in Iraq, will probably welcome a more subdued approach; it seems unlikely in the extreme that Britain will embrace Iran because we spoke with them. And those people who are already against us, sure, maybe they'll cheer on Iran, but there's some chance they're already doing that (not a very big one; Iran is not very popular).
So what's the problem here? Shouldn't we engage with the world, friends and enemies, until it's clear that other actions are needed? Aren't we big enough to do that? No one wants America to be foolish, but unilateral behavior seems to create at least as many problems as it solves, and we definitely need to stop that.
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