One of the great aspects of "new" history is that, by reading history through another point of view, we see things differently or play up facts that wouldn't seem important. Looking at things that are commonly seen as one way through, for example, feminism can illuminate the familiar. So I'm pretty open to history from other perspectives.
It can be overdone, of course, usually for political reasons. Attempts to magnify the Native American contributions to mathematics often come out as ridiculous; there is no reason to try to justify a culture by claiming things that it just didn't do, cultures stand on their own. Eventually, history is what happened, and it is possible to create explanations or find themes that do not grasp at unreality, and the best histories do that.
Did you know that, immediately post-American Revolution, many European countries enacted laws making certain categories of people unable to emigrate to America? The United States was so desperate for skilled workers in a number of trades that it would send agents to entice them to move, and England, Italy, and Germany (among others) fought hard to retain them. I didn't know this before, and I don't know that I would if I hadn't read a history that attempts to explain the rise of the greatest empires through their desire for diversity.
I'm also a sucker for the broad sweeping theory. I admire an author who takes a chance by explaining complicated events with a new perspective, even though I find myself only rarely convinced that the theory is sufficient to explain as much as it's supposed to cover. For example, I truly enjoyed Kevin Phillips' American Theocracy, which, as part of its thesis, states that the last few world powers have come about because of their mastery of the newest source of energy (the Dutch, wind and water; the British, coal; the Americans, oil). I'm not convinced that energy is the sole determinant of a nation's status, but it certainly is a major factor, and Phillips expanded my concept of what to consider.
So I wanted to like Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance - and Why They Fall [2007] (DOE) by Yale law professor Amy Chua. Chua offers a broad theory as to the rise and fall of what she terms "hyperpowers," namely, world-dominant powers. A hyperpower has three characteristics: 1) its power is more than any other rival; 2) its economic and military strength is at least as big as any other in the world; and 3) it extends its power over a vast portion of the world.
Chua's essential theory is: a nation rises (somehow), increases tolerance (problematically defined), becomes a hyperpower, then begins to decline, which is associated with growing intolerance (even Chua admits that cause and effect here are difficult to discern [p. xxiv]), then the nation ceases to be a hyperpower. The biggest problem is a lack of "glue," the inability of the hyperpower to bring the other societies (those of whom the hyperpower is tolerant) into a true sense of belonging.
We have a theory here with a lot of problems. The rise of the nation from country to empire can happen in any of a number of ways, then they embrace tolerance (which, as Chua admits, is a relative and selective tolerance), then the country starts to decline, then becomes intolerant (though the last two steps may happen in the other order, we just don't know), then stops being a hyperpower, probably no longer even a respectable empire. Chua applies this theory to seven different empires (Persia, Rome, Tang dynasty China, Mongol China, 17th century Holland, the British Empire, and modern-day America) and demonstrates, at least for the first six, how the theory holds up.
One personal quibble I'll toss in here. I love maps, I find any history improved by the addition of maps. There are no maps in this book, and it seems quite an omission for a general history like this one. To understand the extent of the Persian Empire without being able to see where we find, for one, Cappadocia is much more difficult. I own the out-of-print Anchor Atlas of World History, an excellent compact reference, so I can see how impressive the Persian Empire was in encompassing everything from Cappadocia to Gedrosia, but the average reader will be hard-pressed to reach this understanding.
Back to the book. Let me talk about the very real positives here, what make the book worth reading even if you don't accept the premise. This is a very entertaining book, with many interesting anecdotes about various eras in world history. It is the very definition of a readable general history, and flags only when the theory is shoehorned into the narrative. Obviously there are omissions, in particular anything that doesn't fit the thesis, and I certainly wouldn't rely on it as my primary source of knowledge about these periods, but it's a good book.
Now, the nits. Economics, which many of us would regard as a major force in history, is given very little attention in DOE. That tolerance may simply be a means to an economic end is pretty much brushed by. When Britain imports Jews from Holland (whose families had earlier emigrated from Spain), this is seen as tolerance (under Chua's liberal definition of the term) rather than an attempt to take advantage of the money they controlled.
Let's not ignore the definition of empire used here - there really isn't one. In the description of the Roman Empire,
At least as important, did the subjugated peoples accept the empire because of the imperial "glue," or because there were real advantages, mainly economic, in joining the larger body? Perhaps this glue is nothing more than the easily-broken consent of the governed.
When DOE moves to the modern hyperpowers, in particular the British Empire and modern-day America, the slope becomes even more slippery. When earlier empires took advantage of (and you can read that statement either way) the diversity of its subjects, what Chua calls tolerance, that made sense, and I'll admit that any large power that was able to use the full range of talents at its disposal probably did better than any that suppressed them (and her use of Nazi Germany and imperial Japan is particularly apt).
But she undercuts her own argument by asking: "Is it possible for a world-dominant power to be genuinely tolerant in the modern, 'enlightened' sense?" [p. 194]. The answer is almost certainly no, as dominance and tolerance are diametrically opposed (it requires us to redefine tolerance as exploitation, which is dangerously close to Chua's argument for the earlier hyperpowers).
It becomes clear by the end of DOE that there is something of an agenda being presented here. It will not surprise the reader that Chua is arguing for fairly open immigration if America is to retain its identity as a hyperpower, that this country needs to continue to harness the talents of everyone within its sphere if it is to retain its stature. It would be just as reasonable to posit that a growing nation needs an infusion of skills from outside, but, perhaps, a mature nation does not.
As she discusses the contenders, China, the European Union, and India, and decides that none will show the tolerance necessary to become a hyperpower, she ignores the way in which technology allows exploitation without inclusion. China may not be very tolerant of foreigners in their midst, at least not in the sense of accepting them as full-fledged members of their society, but that doesn't mean they can't draw on their expertise (or their dollars) over the Internet. I'm not saying that China will become a new hyperpower, I'm just saying they don't need to grant citizenship to Ohioans to get there.
Chua does express some misgivings as to whether the United States should remain a hyperpower, or whether we should be content to become just one of a set of superpowers. She really doesn't make her case that we have a choice in the matter. Besides an open immigration policy, she defends multinational corporations and outsourcing as a way of spreading American "glue." Why, to cite her examples, Google India or Microsoft Ukraine should continue to generate ideas and dollars for the benefit of the U.S. is murky; at best, one can predict a kind of co-dependency, not a continuing feeding of the American hyperpower. (Her third piece of advice to the U.S., multilateralism, is neither clear enough to help her thesis nor detailed enough to make it more than a wish.)
The real lesson of DOE is that we have had six incredibly diverse hyperpowers, none of which followed the same arc as any other. Therefore, to infer from the decline of the others that we can somehow stave off our current decline, and to assume that the only way to do this is through greater tolerance, is a huge logical stretch.
So read this book for what it does offer, an interesting history of previous empires. Don't, however, blindly accept it as a guide to future policy - it doesn't hold up real well when measured in that sense.
It can be overdone, of course, usually for political reasons. Attempts to magnify the Native American contributions to mathematics often come out as ridiculous; there is no reason to try to justify a culture by claiming things that it just didn't do, cultures stand on their own. Eventually, history is what happened, and it is possible to create explanations or find themes that do not grasp at unreality, and the best histories do that.
Did you know that, immediately post-American Revolution, many European countries enacted laws making certain categories of people unable to emigrate to America? The United States was so desperate for skilled workers in a number of trades that it would send agents to entice them to move, and England, Italy, and Germany (among others) fought hard to retain them. I didn't know this before, and I don't know that I would if I hadn't read a history that attempts to explain the rise of the greatest empires through their desire for diversity.
I'm also a sucker for the broad sweeping theory. I admire an author who takes a chance by explaining complicated events with a new perspective, even though I find myself only rarely convinced that the theory is sufficient to explain as much as it's supposed to cover. For example, I truly enjoyed Kevin Phillips' American Theocracy, which, as part of its thesis, states that the last few world powers have come about because of their mastery of the newest source of energy (the Dutch, wind and water; the British, coal; the Americans, oil). I'm not convinced that energy is the sole determinant of a nation's status, but it certainly is a major factor, and Phillips expanded my concept of what to consider.
So I wanted to like Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance - and Why They Fall [2007] (DOE) by Yale law professor Amy Chua. Chua offers a broad theory as to the rise and fall of what she terms "hyperpowers," namely, world-dominant powers. A hyperpower has three characteristics: 1) its power is more than any other rival; 2) its economic and military strength is at least as big as any other in the world; and 3) it extends its power over a vast portion of the world.
Chua's essential theory is: a nation rises (somehow), increases tolerance (problematically defined), becomes a hyperpower, then begins to decline, which is associated with growing intolerance (even Chua admits that cause and effect here are difficult to discern [p. xxiv]), then the nation ceases to be a hyperpower. The biggest problem is a lack of "glue," the inability of the hyperpower to bring the other societies (those of whom the hyperpower is tolerant) into a true sense of belonging.
We have a theory here with a lot of problems. The rise of the nation from country to empire can happen in any of a number of ways, then they embrace tolerance (which, as Chua admits, is a relative and selective tolerance), then the country starts to decline, then becomes intolerant (though the last two steps may happen in the other order, we just don't know), then stops being a hyperpower, probably no longer even a respectable empire. Chua applies this theory to seven different empires (Persia, Rome, Tang dynasty China, Mongol China, 17th century Holland, the British Empire, and modern-day America) and demonstrates, at least for the first six, how the theory holds up.
One personal quibble I'll toss in here. I love maps, I find any history improved by the addition of maps. There are no maps in this book, and it seems quite an omission for a general history like this one. To understand the extent of the Persian Empire without being able to see where we find, for one, Cappadocia is much more difficult. I own the out-of-print Anchor Atlas of World History, an excellent compact reference, so I can see how impressive the Persian Empire was in encompassing everything from Cappadocia to Gedrosia, but the average reader will be hard-pressed to reach this understanding.
Back to the book. Let me talk about the very real positives here, what make the book worth reading even if you don't accept the premise. This is a very entertaining book, with many interesting anecdotes about various eras in world history. It is the very definition of a readable general history, and flags only when the theory is shoehorned into the narrative. Obviously there are omissions, in particular anything that doesn't fit the thesis, and I certainly wouldn't rely on it as my primary source of knowledge about these periods, but it's a good book.
Now, the nits. Economics, which many of us would regard as a major force in history, is given very little attention in DOE. That tolerance may simply be a means to an economic end is pretty much brushed by. When Britain imports Jews from Holland (whose families had earlier emigrated from Spain), this is seen as tolerance (under Chua's liberal definition of the term) rather than an attempt to take advantage of the money they controlled.
Let's not ignore the definition of empire used here - there really isn't one. In the description of the Roman Empire,
Rather than pillaging or looting the cities of defeated foes, Rome offered them treaties of peace that were rarely refused....The conquered cities could continue to be ruled by their own leaders under their own laws, with two conditions. First, each could trade freely with Rome but not with each other; in this way, the smaller city-states quickly became economically dependent on Rome. Second, each was required to provide Rome with troops.Does this really constitute an empire, or is it more a loose confederation? This question, arguable when applied to ancient Rome, is paramount when talking about the Mongol Empire, which barely comprised a single entity (the grandsons of Genghis Khan each took a piece, but didn't seem to rule in concert).
At least as important, did the subjugated peoples accept the empire because of the imperial "glue," or because there were real advantages, mainly economic, in joining the larger body? Perhaps this glue is nothing more than the easily-broken consent of the governed.
When DOE moves to the modern hyperpowers, in particular the British Empire and modern-day America, the slope becomes even more slippery. When earlier empires took advantage of (and you can read that statement either way) the diversity of its subjects, what Chua calls tolerance, that made sense, and I'll admit that any large power that was able to use the full range of talents at its disposal probably did better than any that suppressed them (and her use of Nazi Germany and imperial Japan is particularly apt).
But she undercuts her own argument by asking: "Is it possible for a world-dominant power to be genuinely tolerant in the modern, 'enlightened' sense?" [p. 194]. The answer is almost certainly no, as dominance and tolerance are diametrically opposed (it requires us to redefine tolerance as exploitation, which is dangerously close to Chua's argument for the earlier hyperpowers).
It becomes clear by the end of DOE that there is something of an agenda being presented here. It will not surprise the reader that Chua is arguing for fairly open immigration if America is to retain its identity as a hyperpower, that this country needs to continue to harness the talents of everyone within its sphere if it is to retain its stature. It would be just as reasonable to posit that a growing nation needs an infusion of skills from outside, but, perhaps, a mature nation does not.
As she discusses the contenders, China, the European Union, and India, and decides that none will show the tolerance necessary to become a hyperpower, she ignores the way in which technology allows exploitation without inclusion. China may not be very tolerant of foreigners in their midst, at least not in the sense of accepting them as full-fledged members of their society, but that doesn't mean they can't draw on their expertise (or their dollars) over the Internet. I'm not saying that China will become a new hyperpower, I'm just saying they don't need to grant citizenship to Ohioans to get there.
Chua does express some misgivings as to whether the United States should remain a hyperpower, or whether we should be content to become just one of a set of superpowers. She really doesn't make her case that we have a choice in the matter. Besides an open immigration policy, she defends multinational corporations and outsourcing as a way of spreading American "glue." Why, to cite her examples, Google India or Microsoft Ukraine should continue to generate ideas and dollars for the benefit of the U.S. is murky; at best, one can predict a kind of co-dependency, not a continuing feeding of the American hyperpower. (Her third piece of advice to the U.S., multilateralism, is neither clear enough to help her thesis nor detailed enough to make it more than a wish.)
The real lesson of DOE is that we have had six incredibly diverse hyperpowers, none of which followed the same arc as any other. Therefore, to infer from the decline of the others that we can somehow stave off our current decline, and to assume that the only way to do this is through greater tolerance, is a huge logical stretch.
So read this book for what it does offer, an interesting history of previous empires. Don't, however, blindly accept it as a guide to future policy - it doesn't hold up real well when measured in that sense.
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